The Long-Fabled All-Expansion World Series Is Finally Here!

Long-time readers might know about my semi-obsession with the idea of a World Series match-up consisting only of expansion teams. It seems like the type of thing that should have happened; after all, for the past eighteen seasons, we’ve had league that’s nearly 50/50 original teams/expansion teams (16/14 to be precise, but that’s pretty close). Despite that, though, expansion teams have been extremely underrepresented in October. The lack of an all-expansion team World Series was just another symptom of that.

And now, that’s over, thanks to the Mets’ sweep of the Cubs (the AL side was assured once the Yankees lost). Like I said a month and a half ago, this postseason would be our best shot to break the streak in three decades (1986 saw three expansion teams in a four team tournament, and still couldn’t pull it off), but the odds were still only at about 22%. In honor of those odds, I’ve decided to look a little more closely at the math behind this momentous occasion.

First, it’s interesting to look back at those odds; 22% was our best chance at the start of October in years, and yet, in the abstract, it doesn’t seem that great. Assuming each team has an equal 1/30 chance of winning it all in Spring Training, we’d assume the chance of an all-expansion World Series in any given year to be 21.78%, just below the 21.875% I calculated back in September*.  That’s 7/15 in the AL times 7/15 in the NL. And yet, somehow, it ranks as one of the best chances we’ve ever seen. Certainly within the top five, at least. Why is that?

*Note: Given the short series and random nature of the postseason, I rounded each team’s chance in a given series to 50%. For quick and rough calculations, that’s probably close enough. In any case, it fits in with my “assume each team has an equal chance” method that I’ll use for the rest of this article. Also, part of my reasoning for assuming every team has a 1/30 chance is that we’re not dealing with a specific year, but any random year. For example, if I told you we’d have 30 teams still in the year 2030, what odds would you assign each team lacking specifics? Given that we haven’t quantified the effect of being an expansion team, setting each team as equal seems reasonably fair. Since we’re essentially assigning the 2015 odds with 1960 knowledge for most of the piece, this seemed like a fair estimation.

I really can’t say for sure. I mean, we all kind of know that expansion teams have a rougher go of things than either league’s original eight. There are probably specific underlying reasons for that, and hopefully someone has looked into it more extensively. All I’ll be doing here is showing how rough it’s been for these underdogs.

So, assuming that every team has an equal chance of winning the World Series in a given random year, what were the odds it would take us until 2015 to get only expansion teams? What I did was look at the league’s make-up each year, in terms of expansion and non-expansion teams, just like I did earlier. I did this for each season since MLB started adding teams way back in 1961. Then, I took to probability of an all-expansion series each season and multiplied it with the previous years. Basically, what I wanted to figure out was: if you were told in 1960 how the league would expand in the next five and a half decades, what would the chances be that it would take until 2015 for two of them to meet at year’s end?

In the end, through 2014, those odds came down to 0.018%. In fractions, that works out to less than 1/5000 (and yes, that’s removing the 1994 postseason that never was). Is this a reasonable estimation? I mean, if we could quantify how expansion teams are disadvantaged, it would probably be a little less surprising. At the same time, though, I’m not sure that it would explain everything. I mean, over half of the first eight expansion teams from the 1960s still haven’t won a World Series. Is that all due to the pains of being an expansion team? The Astros, Rangers, Padres, Nationals, and Brewers are all fifty years old or getting close; can they still point to the fact that they’re an expansion team as the cause of their woes? I really don’t know.  Whether it’s dumb luck or a sign of how disadvantaged these newer teams are, it’s an interesting fact.

Let’s look at it a few different ways, though. Less than half of the fourteen expansion teams have won a single World Series (past champions are the Mets, Royals, Blue Jays, Marlins, Diamondbacks, and Angels). Only three have won it all twice (the Mets, Blue Jays, and Marlins, which is quite an interesting group). It seems fitting that our first all-expansion series comes down to the Mets and Royals or Blue Jays, in a way; the Mets or Jays would become the first three-time champion, while the Royals could become the fourth repeat winner. Additionally, those three were the first three expansion champions (the Mets in 1969 and 1986*, the Royals in 1985, and the Blue Jays in 1992 and 1993).

*Note: When you look at it this way, it seems kind of funny that the Mets have the reputation that they do. They were the first expansion team to win it all, no expansion team has more titles or as many pennants (5; only the Royals have more than 2, and either they’ll get number 4 or the Blue Jays will get number 3), their success has been pretty spaced out (pennants in 1969, 1973, 1986, 2000, 2015, NLCS losses in 2006, 1999, and 1988), etc.      

Which brings up another interesting point; we were in the second longest expansion-champion drought ever. The 2003 Marlins were our last one, twelve seasons ago. The only longer dry run for expansion teams was between the first two, from 1969 to 1985 (sixteen seasons). The drought from first expansion team to first expansion champion was even shorter than that (1961 to 1969). With those three extended droughts, you could probably deduce that eight of the ten expansion titles (counting this year) came in a nineteen year span (which included 1994, so it was only eighteen seasons). What caused that approximately-two-decade burst? Again, no idea.

Which gives me one last interesting pieces of trivia: how many expansion World Series should we have “expected” for expansion teams? Again, we’ll use the assumption that every team has an equal chance in a given year. Given that, the expected value for a expansion team winning the World Series in a given year is about .467 (which equals 14/30). Essentially, since about half the league is expansion teams, you’d “expect” an expansion team to win about every other season.

Except that there haven’t always been fourteen expansion teams. Once we account for the gradual growth over time, we come out to about 20.44 “expected” titles for these new teams. In real life, we’re at only 10 (counting this season). For pennants, we find something similar; there “should” be 40.68 pennants for expansion teams, yet we’re only at 22. Is this a quantification of the effect of being an expansion team? That you’re half as likely to win the World Series in a given year in perpetuity? Again, I’m not sure, but it’s an interesting result nonetheless.

A few more notes that don’t fit in elsewhere: No expansion team has more World Series titles than a non-expansion team. The Mets or Blue Jays would be the first, and they’d pass the Indians, Cubs, and Phillies. The Mets’ 2015 pennant ties them with the Indians with five; again, none of the original sixteen has fewer than that. The Royals winning this year would become the second expansion team with four pennants, while the Blue Jays would be only the third with three. The Ranges and Padres are the only other expansion teams with more than one. The only two teams without a pennant are expansion teams (the Mariners and Nationals). Also, expansion teams are well-represented in the overall title drought department. While none of them can match the Cubs or Indians, the next six longest active droughts are all expansion teams who have never won (the Rangers, Astros, Brewers, Padres, Nationals, and Mariners).

Whatever happens the rest of the year, history has been made. Here’s to an exciting rest of the season.

Why MLB Should Seed Playoff Teams Based on Record Alone

Over time, I’ve written several pieces about the change to baseball’s playoff system. Overall, I’d say my position on it has shifted from “Get rid of the second wild card” to “if we’re going to have a fifth team, at least do it better than we are now”. I would hope that prospective improvement is something that we can all agree is a good goal, right? So what would prospective improvement for the current system be?

Well, I think there are a number of things that could be fixed, but the one I want to focus on today is seeding. You may or may not have heard, but the three best records in the majors this year all belong to teams in the NL Central. Despite this, the Pirates and Cubs will need to play one game to determine which one of them “really” deserves a post-season spot, at which point the winner will face the Cardinals. So we are guaranteed to see only one of the best records in the majors making the Championship Series round.

That’s a little absurd. Why can’t baseball switch to seeding solely based on record, like the NBA recently decided to do? I see people arguing against it all the time, but the arguments just don’t make sense to me. The Pirates won 98 games; the Cubs won 97. You mean to tell me that, because they were assigned to the Central division back in 1994, that the 92-win Dodgers and 90-win Mets deserve those automatic bids to the ALDS more? Sure, sure, you can scream “DOESN’T MATTER, JUST WIN YOUR DIVISON” all you want, that still doesn’t explain why teams that did less to win their division (in just about every conceivable way) than the Pirates and the Cubs should see benefits. It’s not even like the Mets and Dodgers were noticeably better at beating the Cardinals; they went 3-4 and 2-5 versus St. Louis respectively, while the Cubs went 8-11 and the Pirates went 9-10.

Some might point out that it’s rare for the three best teams in the majors to all come from one division, and that is true. However, what’s not uncommon at all is for a wild card winner to have a better record than a division winner; since the first full season with the new format in 1995, there have been thirteen seasons in the AL and fourteen seasons in the NL where the top Wild Card has had a better record than at least one division winner. 

Looking at Playoff Droughts and the Fabled Expansion World Series

It’s a little hard to believe, but we only have about a month left in the season. And, while the playoff field is far from set, we already have a pretty good idea of which teams will still be playing coming October.

Among those teams likely to go is the Toronto Blue Jays, who will (if they make it) be appearing in the postseason for the first time in 22 years, the longest active playoff drought in baseball right now. However, there’s a funny second side to that possibility that I realized the other day; of the set of ten teams in postseason position right now, the Blue Jays actually have the third-shortest World Series drought. No, really, look at each team’s last championship:

Blue Jays: 1993
Royals: 1985
Astros: Never (team founded in 1962)
Yankees: 2009
Rangers: Never (team founded in 1961)
Mets: 1986
Cardinals: 2011
Dodgers: 1988
Pirates: 1979
Cubs: 1908

That fact got me thinking back to last year, when I looked at the championship droughts of the 2014 postseason.  How does this season stack up to the rest of the wild card era?

Predicting the Future of the 3000 Strikeout Club

Growing up, I always thought of 3000 strikeouts and 300 wins as the pitchers equivalents of 3000 hits and 500 home runs. Now, though, I get the feeling that it’s not necessarily the case. I don’t really have any single point that proves it, just a hunch built around small things. When a player gets close, the countdown to 3000 strikeouts gets some love, but not as much as those three. No one bothers playing “what if” about Mike Mussina reaching 3000 strikeouts like they do with 300 wins, despite the fact that he was even closer to the former than the latter (2813 K’s versus only 270 W’s). Everyone freaked out when Craig Biggio became the first (clean) 3000 hit guy in forever to not waltz in to Cooperstown two years ago, but there was no similar panic about his fellow ballot debut Curt Schilling struggling despite becoming the only (again, clean) 3000 strikeout guy not in.

The funny thing is, 3000 strikeouts is the rarest of those four milestones. We’ve got twenty-four 300-win guys, twenty-six 500-homer guys, and Ichiro will be 3000 hit guy number thirty next season. But 3000 strikeouts? There have only been sixteen of those. Even when you account for the number of 300 win pitchers who were deadball guys*, it’s pretty even; since Walter Johnson (the first to 3000 strikeouts and a 300 winner himself), there have been fifteen 3000 K pitchers and fourteen 300 win pitchers.

*Fun fact: seven of the 300 win club, or over one quarter, reached the mark before the first World Series was played.

Even with the mismatch in appreciation, I think the 3000 strikeout milestone is important. And, since it’s much more closely tied to skill than wins, it seemed like the more sensible pitching milestone to measure like I have with hits and homers.  One thing that surprised me as I did research was the relative modernity of the club. Six members have retired in the past decade; everyone in the club except Walter Johnson and Bob Gibson started in the ‘60s or later (and Bob Gibson just misses, starting in 1959).

Predicting the Future of the 500 Home Run Club

After looking at the future of the 3000 hit club last month, I began wanting to try my method out with other milestones. The natural next step was the other big milestone for hitters, 500 home runs. Would there be any difference in how early we could predict who would make each club? The Hall of Fame induction ceremony seemed like as good an excuse as any to look at a milestone like this (even if it was three 3000 strikeout guys and a 3000 hit guy getting inducted this year).

A quick refresher on the methodology: first, I went through the 26 members of the 500 home run club and looked at how many home runs they had at each age. I sorted them by totals, then split the club into the upper half and lower half. Next, I looked at how many hitters throughout history had more home runs than the lower half at the same age. Then, I just took a simple percentage of (upper half of the club) divided by (total number of retired hitters who had more homers than the lower half of the club at the same age). I expanded on what I did for the 3000 hit article, though; rather than just do the halfway point, the lowest, and the second lowest, I threw in the quartiles (the halfway marks of the halves). That way, I could estimate the odds for players above 25% and 75% of the 500 homer club.

In each grouping, I took out the players in the quartile above, so that I'm not double counting, say, the guys in the top quartile as in the second quartile as well even though they are above the mark needed to be in that group. This is to give a more accurate sense of how likely players in that quartile specifically are to reach the 500 mark; using the player with the most homers at that age to predict someone just over the halfway point seemed a little silly. This leads to a little fluctuation in the results (sometimes, the second quartile will have fewer players eventually making 500 home runs than the third quartile, for instance), but usually, the variations aren’t too significant.

These odds aren’t going to be super-precise for a variety of reasons; this is a very rough model, the game has evolved dramatically since when some of these players played, I’m not really weighting each player by where they are individually, and so on. However, I think it gives us a pretty good rough idea; it may be off, but it gives us a tangible, easy to visualize predictor for something that’s normally pretty difficult to predict. As an aside, I’d caution against using the “Lowest” number as a hard guideline, since that player was almost always an outlier; sticking to the “Second Lowest” benchmark and above should be more indicative. So, with that in mind, which modern players are on pace for 500 home runs?

Examining a Baseball Alternate Universe: What if MLB Teams Couldn't Relocate?

The other day, I saw an interesting thought experiment: what would MLB look like today if no teams had ever moved? I put a lot of thought into the question, and wound up with this interesting Alternate Universe take on baseball, and I wanted to share it.

To start with, if no teams had ever moved going all the way back to the turn of the century when the AL became the second major league back in 1901, we'd have the following cities covered:

AL: Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, Milwaukee (last two are interesting because they moved to New York* and St. Louis almost immediately; I'll touch on this in a bit)

NL: St. Louis, Cincinnati, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, Brooklyn, Pittsburgh

*Note: technically, it’s disputed whether the New York team that arose in 1903 is linked to the Baltimore team. For my purposes, I’m going to count them the same, since the New York team essentially opened right when the Baltimore team folded, taking its place.

2015 All-Star Roster Fixer-Upper

It’s hard to believe that I’ve been doing these All-Star Roster fixer-uppers for six years now. And while this year’s set has one of the dumbest overall choices I’ve seen in my entire time doing this, we’re getting fewer and fewer totally inexplicable decisions. In fact, there are so few major changes to the rosters that I could actually combine them into one piece this year. But to do so in a concise manner, we’re going to need to jump right in, so let’s do just that.

Predicting the Future of the 3000 Hit Club

As you may know, I enjoy trying to predict the future for ballplayers. So, when A-Rod got his 3000^th hit, a thought crossed my mind: could I apply my framework for predicting future Hall of Famers to milestones like 3000 hits? This is the result.

What I did was as follows: first, I went through the 29 players with 3000 hits and checked where they all stood hit-wise at each age. Then, I looked at the median mark for the group, and checked how many ballplayers in history had reached that number of hits by the same age. Then, I took a straight percentage of how many of the total number of players at that mark actually wound up over 3000 hits.

For an example, say that the 15^th most hits at age 20 among 3000-hit players was 100. I then looked at how many players in history had 100 hits through their age 20 season, and figured out the percentage of that number that went on to 3000 hits. After that, just to get another benchmark, I repeated the process with the lowest hit total in the 3000 hit club by age (and second lowest, since many of the lowest marks were by Cap Anson, who played in such a radically different time that I wasn’t sure how useful of a marker he’d be for other players).

With the percentage of players at each milestone that went on to 3000 hits, I then looked towards the game today, checking the leaders of each age bracket today against the historical marks.

Out of the Park Baseball 16 and the 1996 Cleveland Indians

Once again, this year, I’ve been given the chance to play Out of the Park Baseball’s new edition and write about it. This year’s edition is another wonderful entry in the series-I feel like it’s definitely the smartest entry in the series yet, at least, with computer teams acting closer and closer to real people. It certainly made my yearly alternate-history run a lot more interesting, at least. So what alternate baseball history did it let me try out this time?

As you may or may not be aware, the city of Cleveland just saw its most recent best hope for a title in five decades end. Maybe the Indians can turn it around and take the title this year, but realistically, it seems that the city’s chances at a title will have to wait until 2016. One thing that fascinates me about this drought, though, is the presence of the 1990s Indians. That group has to be the closest thing a baseball team can be to a dynasty without actually winning anything. From 1994 to 2001, they averaged a .578 winning percentage (about 93 and a half wins over a full season), peaking with a .644 mark in 1995. They made the playoffs six out of seven times (since 1994 was a strike year) and won two pennants. They had a core that included peak play from Jim Thome, Manny Ramirez, Kenny Lofton, Omar Vizquel, Roberto Alomar, and Albert Belle, all of whom have varying degrees of cases for the Hall of Fame. They couldn’t even find a spot for future inner-circle Hall of Pretty Great player Brian Giles because they were just too deep.

But they couldn’t capture that elusive title. Which is why I’m giving them a chance to go back and claim it. I’m taking control of the Indians starting in 1995, and seeing if I can guide them to their first World Series win since 1948.

Examining the Arguments Against the DH

More and more people lately seem to be weighing in on the designated hitter. It started a little over a month ago, with Adam Wainwright and Max Scherzer sustaining injuries while batting. I expected it to be a story for a while then go away, but I’ve continued to see rumblings about it since then, so I figured I should finally weigh in on the matter.

I’ve never really had much of a preference on the matter. I like that the leagues have different rules and all that. But the more I think about it the last month, the more that I think if I had to pick one rule to govern both the AL and NL, I’d unquestionably come down in favor of the DH.

I realize that most of the reasoning is aesthetics. Having 1/9th of a lineup be an automatic rally-killer is irritating. I realize that fans of the pitcher batting will argue that it isn’t, that I should look at things like Clayton Kershaw’s 3-hit game last night. Yes, it’s great that Kershaw made headlines for going 3-4 with a double. But that in and of itself kind of just shows how sad the situation is; Kershaw got headlines for his 3 hit games, despite the fact that he was arguably the worst of the eight hitters who managed the feat on June 1st alone (and that was on a travel day-the day before saw 20 such games). He wasn’t even the best 3-hit game on his own team on Monday.

Which Last Place Team Is Most Likely to Turn It Around?

We now stand a little over a fifth of the way through the season, past the point were divisions can see a total flip-flop over night. They haven’t fully stabilized yet, though; it’s still only been just over 30 games, after all, and there’s plenty that could still happen. I decided to take this thought to the optimistic end and ask “Which team currently in last place is most likely to turn it all around?”

Right now, there are actually essentially seven teams in last in their divisions, thanks to a tie out east: the Orioles, the Red Sox, the Indians, the Athletics, the Phillies, the Brewers, and the Rockies. There are undoubtedly some good teams in the bunch, as is usually the case after only a month and a half of third. Heck, I even picked some of those teams as division winners. But is there any reason to expect differently now that they’re in last? Going over them one-by-one:

Philadelphia Phillies

The Phillies are probably the least likely to turn things around, out of this seven. Right now trail the NL East, with an 11-23 record that leaves them 9.5 games back. For as bad as having the worst record in the Majors sounds, what makes it worse is that they’re still outpacing they’re Pythagorean record by two games. Even GM Ruben Amaro, Jr. admitted they’re a little outmatched. And if they decide to start trading off veterans like Cole Hamels, it’ll only get worse. So yeah, this one is probably a no.

Milwaukee Brewers

Technically not as bad as the Phillies, with a 12-22 record. But playing in the same division as the current best team in baseball leaves them even further behind, at 11.0 back. On top of that, they’ve already fired their manager and announced that they’re sellers this year. So, once again, it seems pretty unlikely here.

Colorado Rockies

While we’re on the topic trade rumors, there’s one going around now that Troy Tulowitzki will be demanding one out of Colorado soon. It’ll already be difficult for the Rockies to bounce back with him; they’re 11-18 and 9.5 back. I predicted them to be in the running for worst team in the Majors at the start of the year and they’ve certainly lived down to that expectation. Troy Tulowitzki and Nolan Arenado are a nice starting point, but their ace is 24-year-old rookie Eddie Butler and their number two is Kyle Kendrick.

Oakland Athletics

They’re 13-22, so a tad better than the other teams covered, and only 8.0 games out, so there’s less work to do. Also, it seems they have less to turn around than most last-place teams; the A’s are one of two last-place teams with a winning Pythagorean record (the other, funnily enough, are the O’s). So the talent definitely seems to be there (although losing Jarrod Parker to injury again hurts, seeing as he would have helped a rather thin rotation). (Edit: Also, they'll be getting Ben Zobrist back, which should be a shot in the arm.)

Cleveland Indians

They’re a little worse off than the Athletics, thanks to an 11-20 record and a 9.0 game deficit, but I also anticipated them being stronger in the pre-season than the Athletics. Yan Gomes’s injury hurts, but Jason Kipnis is bouncing back, and Michael Brantley, Ryan Rayburn, and Carlos Santana are staying strong. Their starting pitching seems to be doing okay (Fangraphs puts them tenth in WAR), so if the lineup and rotation aren’t the big issues, what’s wrong? Well, their bullpen (21^st) and fielding (25^th) are bad. Are those going to keep up? Maybe, but I’d imagine they’re easier to fix (whether through concentrated effort or just a change in luck, since they’re both rather tempermental) than the first two things. Still, that’s a big early hole. It can be done, though.

Baltimore Orioles

Boston Red Sox

These two are easily the most likely. Despite being tied for last, they’re both doing rather respectably (15-18 for Boston, 14-17 for Baltimore), and are fewer games back from first (5.5) than some second-place teams are (the Cubs and the Giants, specifically). Starting from that close is already a pretty sizable advantage when handicapping these things.

If you want to bet on a single worst-to-first story, one of these two is your best choice. But which one? Well, while they are “tied”, Baltimore seems much better positioned to strike than Boston. They haven’t been outscored nearly as badly (a 16-15 Pythag, to Boston’s 13-20). Plus, there’s help coming off the DL: the Orioles finally got back J.J. Hardy, will see the return of Matt Wieters soon, will hopefully move young starter Kevin Gausman to the rotation upon his return, and will get Jonathan Schoop back eventually. Add in that Manny Machado, Chris Davis, and Ubaldo Jimenez seem to be having bouncebacks from weaker 2014 while the Red Sox struggle to find one above-average starter and that seems to make the difference. The Red Sox may also turn it around; even with their pitching weakness, they still have a lineup that can club any opposing team into submission. They just seem a little less well-rounded.

So there you have it. Maybe it’s partly my Orioles fandom clouding my judgment, but even trying to set that aside, no other last place team looks as ready for a turnaround.

Predictions for the 2015 Season

The 2015 season is fast approaching, which means it’s time for predictions! I’ve put a lot of time into these in the past, to decent-not-great results. So, in an effort to improve that track record, I’ll try to be less meticulous and just predict every division in one article. That doesn’t seem to make sense, but a lot of things in baseball don’t make sense either, so I’ll probably be fine. Onwards:

Predicting Today's Hall of Fame Starters, 2015 Edition

Last week, I kicked off the new year by looking way, way ahead, specifically at which active position players today might be making the Hall of Fame one day. As you probably could have guessed, today, I’m looking at the other half of the equation, the pitchers.

Again, my methods are as follows: first, I look at the median career Wins Above Replacement for Hall of Famers at each position. Then, I look at how many non-Hall of Famers (excluding active or not-yet-eligible ones) were at that mark at each age, excluding players on the ballot. Then, I take a simple percentage: number of Hall of Famers above the age-median WAR out of total players at that same mark. For pitchers specifically, I only looked at players who began their careers after 1920, due to how different the role was in the Deadball Era. Also, I made sure to only look at starters, as relievers are entirely different.

Also, the normal caveats: first, this doesn’t account for the possibility of people who missed the Hall one day making it via the Veterans Committee. Also, this doesn’t account for people who were Hall worthy but didn’t make it; this is just measuring people making the Hall of Fame, not having Hall-worthy careers. Also, keep in mind that not making these cutoffs doesn’t necessarily mean that a player won’t make the Hall (in fact, two of the three pitchers who look likely to make it to Cooperstown this year didn’t hit these marks).

Anyway, here are the median career WAR totals, the percentage of players that have made the Hall at that level, and the amount of WAR someone would need each season to stay on pace. Also, although I’ll only be covering players up through age 35, I included a little more because the numbers are interesting:

Predicting Today's Future Hall of Fame Hitters, 2015 Edition

In what’s becoming an annual offseason tradition, I decided to again look at which young and active players where on pace for the Hall of Fame. As in years past, I’ll start with hitters today and move onto pitchers in the next few days.

Just as a refresher on my methods: First, I look at how Hall of Famers were playing at each age and sort them by career Wins Above Replacement through that season. I look at the median, then see how many players were above the median at that age but didn’t make the Hall. Then, I simply see what percentage of players above that mark made the Hall.

Below is the chart with the results, including how much WAR a player would need to total at each level to stay on pace:

Age	WAR	Increase	Calculation
20	0.5	0.5	24.79%
21	2	1.5	32.21%
22	4	2	34.27%
23	7.7	3.7	40.72%
24	11.3	3.6	43.29%
25	16	4.7	49.32%
26	20.35	4.35	51.77%
27	25.6	5.25	55.73%
28	31.4	5.8	64.35%
29	35.4	4	67.89%
30	39.5	4.1	71.15%
31	43.8	4.3	74.75%
32	48.4	4.6	76.29%
33	50.9	2.5	75.51%
34	53.3	2.4	75.51%
35	56	2.7	77.08%

With that out of the way, let’s look at who made each mark this year.